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Abstract: 
Buried deep within the zemiological movement and its supportive literature is the implicit 
assumption that the word zemia, the organising concept around which zemiology is built, 
simply represents ‘the Greek word for harm’. This interpretation has supported numerous 
drives to ‘move beyond criminology’ and erect strict borders between the study of crime and 
harm. However a deeper, albeit still rather brief, exploration of zemia reveals that it possesses 
a broader range of meaning than that commonly afforded to it. By beginning to unpick 
zemia’s semantic genealogy, it appears that the conventional use of the word to support the 
imposition of false alternatives between criminology and zemiology is untenable. 
Accordingly, this chapter attempts to foreground a more integrated approach to the study of 
crime and harm.  
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Introduction: 
The discipline of criminology has long been beset by a nagging tension that seemingly runs 
right to its heart. That is, the tension between the concepts of ‘crime’ and ‘harm’. Debates 
regarding the appropriateness of the terms’ conceptual boundaries, range of theoretical 
efficacy and empirical operationalisation have occupied scholars, particularly those on the 
margins of criminology’s boundaries, for years (Pemberton 2016; Hughes 2006). Indeed, the 
issues raised by these debates continue to animate scholars who appear determined to settle 
the issue, to finally put to bed a tension that has in many ways become regarded as innate to 
the discipline. Certainly one of the most concerted efforts to lay bare the complexities of this 
long running tension, albeit from a particular view, can be found in the landmark study 
Beyond Criminology: Taking Harm Seriously (Hillyard et al. 2004a). Authored by a less than 
unified congregation of scholars (Pemberton 2016; Hillyard 2013) the text draws attention to 
both conceptual issues and empirical blind spots that pervade and impair the mainstream 
criminological enterprise. Notwithstanding the broad and diverse range of positions occupied 
by the contributors, the works that make up this collection take great pains to stress “the 
perceived deficiencies of the concept of crime as a lens to capture the full range of harms that 
impact on our lives” (Pemberton 2016, 4). 
Although such deficiencies have been well highlighted before the publication of 
Beyond Criminology (see for example Muncie 2000; Henry and Lanier 1998; Milovanovic 
and Henry 2001; Henry and Milovanovic 1996; Tifft and Sullivan 2001), students of 
criminology and zemiology are often encouraged to view the aforementioned text as the 
decisive voice in challenging criminological constraints. This, however, has salient 
implications. Whilst scholars such as Muncie (2000), for instance, have advocated the utility 
of reconceptualising criminology’s legitimate domain of inquiry so as to decentre ‘crime’ as 
the sole object of study and broaden its focal concerns beyond myopic understandings of the 
‘crime problem’, some of those associated with the latter movement have been less subtle. 
Rather than aiming to “significantly extend the legitimate parameters of criminological study 
away from a limited focus on those injurious acts defined as such by the criminal law” 
(Hopkins Burke 2014, 256), the message conveyed by Hillyard et al. (2004b) is to move 
entirely beyond criminology, as only then, we are told, may we be able to ‘take harm 
seriously’. Essentially, what develops here is a binary between those who wish to extend the 
legitimate parameters of criminology to incorporate a wider range of un-criminalised and 
hidden harms as serious focal concerns within its orbit of inquiry, and those who wish to 
dispense with the discipline entirely. Accordingly, there now exists a palpable tension not 
only between the concepts of ‘crime’ and ‘harm’ but between the disciplines apparently 
charged with their investigation, criminology and zemiology.    
However, we may wish to question the accuracy and efficacy of delimiting strict 
borders between these subjects. In fact, a closer reading of the term zemia, which forms the 
conceptual basis of zemiology, reveals much in this regard. Much like the Latin origin of the 
word ‘crime’, crimen, which was heavily imbued with broad notions of harm (Muncie, 
Talbot, and Walters 2010), the Greek term zemia denotes much more than harm. Yet despite 
connoting harm, loss, and punishment, among other things, the rough translation of zemia as 
‘the Greek word for harm’ permeates the literature (Hillyard et al. 2004b; Hillyard 2013; 
Pemberton 2016; Loader and Sparks 2011) and reinforces the idea that criminology is for 
crime and zemiology is for harm. This raises two important questions. Firstly, has the term 
zemia, as the basis for zemiology, been adequately explored and applied? Secondly, does a 
more holistic reading of the term substantiate the tendency to position crime and harm, and 
criminology and zemiology, as diametric opposites? The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
these questions. By offering both critique and avenues for further development it is hoped 
that it may in some way contribute to ongoing discussions relating to the fracture between 
criminology and zemiology. As Hillyard and Tombs (2017, 296) rightly point out, such 
dialogical advancement not only signals genuine engagement with previous work but is “the 
stuff of healthy academic life”.  
Exploring Zemia 
Somewhat surprisingly, the nuanced lexical formation of zemia, the central concept around 
which zemiology has been organised, has received limited attention. Indeed, even in the 
pioneering work of Beyond Criminology, reference to the term zemia occurs only once in a 
fleeting gesture of explanation. The editors, in an attempt to clarify the naming of this new 
discipline, note that “[t]he new discipline was termed Zemiology from the Greek Zemia, 
meaning harm” (Hillyard et al. 2004b, 276). Later, Hillyard (2013, 220) reveals the 
circumstances surrounding this decision making process: 
A few of the Bristol Group were chatting in the sun with Professor Vassilis 
Karydis and I asked him what was the Greek word for harm and he said it 
was zemia, hence zemiology. The study of harm as a new comprehensive 
discipline distinct from criminology was therefore born. 
This somewhat circumstantial naming process has had profound and lasting effects. 
Subsequent authors have uncritically adopted this interpretation and continue to advance a 
seemingly intuitive homology between the term zemia, the concept of harm and the 
‘zemiological’ study of phenomena so conceptualised. For instance, Loader and Sparks 
(2011, 151) note that the term zemiology “derives from the Greek word ‘zemia’ meaning 
harm”. Similarly, Pemberton (2016, 6, original emphasis) states that “…zemiology, derived 
from the Greek xemia for harm, denotes the study of harm”. As a final example, an entry in 
the third edition of The Sage Dictionary of Criminology adds in parenthesis, following the 
word ‘zemiology’, “from the Greek zemia, meaning harm” (Muncie 2013, 430, original 
emphasis). As a text often recommended to undergraduate criminology students as 
introductory reading, this vague interpretation of zemia is particularly problematic.   
This issue should not be cast aside or rated a second order concern, a matter of ‘mere 
semantics’, since greater semantic analysis is precisely what is required here. As alluded to 
previously, further development of this line of inquiry is salient for in its current dominant 
translation/interpretation the term zemia remains devoid of its numerous other connotations 
and is therefore stilted and rather limiting. Restricted to a single meaning, zemia has become 
both a limited organizing concept of the emerging zemiology and the justification for its sole 
focus upon ‘social harm’ and the exclusion of ‘criminal harm’ (Pemberton 2016). 
Accordingly, a deeper exploration of zemia is needed. This requires an effort to trace with 
more accuracy the subtle nuances in the lexical formation of zemia (Boukli 2019). In doing 
so one is able to register understated interconnections between its various connotations and in 
turn question the efficacy of the dominant drive to carve out a ‘zemiological niche’ that 
focuses only upon a bounded conception of harm, artificially divorced from the broader 
facets with which the term zemia is concerned. 
The word zemia is often understood to mean ‘hurt’, ‘damage’ (Saunders 1991) and, 
among other things, the imposition of ‘harm’ or ‘loss’ upon an individual (Cairns 2015). 
These understandings are perhaps the closest fit to the dominant reading of zemia currently 
employed throughout much of the social harm literature. Indeed, within this growing body of 
work copious references are made to various forms of financial, physical, psychological and 
environmental losses and damage which impinge upon basic human needs, rights and 
planetary well-being. This includes, but is not limited to, poverty, debt, malnutrition, 
inadequate housing, the proliferation of preventable illness and disease, pollution, habitat 
destruction, accelerated animal extinction, resource depletion, genocide and numerous other 
deleterious events or absences, often associated with either too little or too much state 
intervention (Hillyard and Tombs 2007; Muncie 2000). As an illustration of this ‘closeness of 
fit’, Henry and Milovanovic (1996, 103, emphasis added) refer to harms of reduction as 
constituting “…a loss of some quality relative to [one’s] present standing”. Moreover, harms 
of repression are said to occur when one experiences a restriction or disadvantage, preventing 
the achievement of a desired outcome or standing (Henry and Milovanovic 1996). Similarly, 
Tifft and Sullivan (2001, 198) define social harms as “actions or arrangements that physically 
and spiritually injure and/or thwart the needs, development, potentiality, health, and dignity 
of others”; in other words, the perpetuation of social conditions that facilitate the mass 
production of what Bauman (2004, 5) refers to as “‘human waste’, or more correctly wasted 
humans”.  
While much of the social harm literature acknowledges the intellectual debt owed to 
early pioneers such as Sutherland (1945) and the Schwendingers (1975), the debt evidently 
runs much deeper. For example, Aristotle identifies ‘the just’ (to dikaion) as constituting the 
mean between gain (kerdos) and loss (zemia) (O’Connor 1991). Any deviation from this 
mean is to “transgress an external standard of distributive fairness” and therefore constitutes 
injustice (Balot 2001, 27; Boukli 2019). For Aristotle, injustice may also derive from forms 
of wastefulness that lead to harm to others (O’Connor 1991). Another reading of zemia 
provided by Allen (2000, 69) indicates that in classical Athenian society “zemia primarily 
meant ‘harmful loss’ or ‘payment’” and understood outside the context of punishment the 
word “linked the process of punitive exchange to the process of monetary exchange and to 
the status of citizens as economic actors”.  
Interestingly, the word zemia can also be understood in the context of punishment. 
According to Saunders (1991, 3) the Greeks historically “had no single word for 
‘punishment’” but among the more notable terms we find zemia which Saunders (1991, 4) 
takes to denote “‘hurt’, ‘damage’, especially loss of money, suffered by offender by way of 
retaliation, hence ‘penalty’”. Similarly, its cognate term zemioun means “‘to damage’, ‘to 
fine’” (Saunders 1991, 4). Accordingly the word zemia and its cognate terms describe 
retaliatory procedures that may naturally be viewed as the enactment of punishment 
(Saunders 1991). Cairns (2015) highlights the use of the word zemia in Athenian homicide 
speeches to denote the imposition of a lawful penalty upon an individual who has been 
convicted, in a legal context, of an offence. Additionally, Versnel (1992) recounts how zemia 
is also used to convey a kind of ritualised punishment/penalty imposed for the committal of 
an offence in an attempt to expiate wrongdoings. Allen (2000) also identifies a number of 
punitive words used in fourth century Greece to signify punishment, among which she notes 
the word zemia as denoting penalty. In this context, zemia and its cognate zemioo (to suffer 
damage) refer to the effect or consequence punishment has on the wrongdoer rather than a 
“set of relations between people or their roles in punishment” (Allen 2000, 69). Allen (2000, 
174) further demonstrates the punitive tones zemia possesses by referring to Demosthenes’ 
explicit description of laws as a codified delineation of how much anger should be ascribed to 
various wrongdoings: “Observe that the laws treat the wilful and hubristic wrongdoer as 
worthy of greater anger (orge) and punishment (zemia)”.   
From this brief exploration of zemia we can see that it possesses greater lexical 
diversity than it is commonly credited with (see also Boukli and Kotzé, this volume; Boukli 
2019). Certainly, from this view there is a discernible relationship between zemia, 
jurisprudence and the punishment of legal transgression, commonly referred to as ‘crime’. 
Yet the meaning of this relationship is by no means straightforward, for contained within the 
above paragraph is a complex dyad. On the one hand we may note the obvious reference in 
Allen (2000) to the harmful effects and consequences of punishment that animate Hillyard 
and Tombs’ (2007) concern regarding criminalisation and punishment. On the other hand, we 
may note the equally obvious reference to the notion of proportionality of punishment, a 
cornerstone of modern day jurisprudence (Zedner 2004). The crux of the matter is that neither 
part of this dyad should be elevated or given precedence over the other. Indeed, based upon 
this revised reading and the clear conceptual linkages that emerge between notions of harm, 
loss and the punishment of transgression it seems illogical to force an artificial cleavage 
between crime and harm. In this context, not to mention the well-established centrality of 
harm to crime (Paoli and Greenfield 2013), Pemberton (2016) is perhaps inexpedient to 
separate ‘social’ and ‘criminal’ harms in such a way as to perpetuate false dichotomies. 
Certainly, what we end up with from this bid to carve out a zemiological niche that focusses 
solely upon the former at the expense of the latter is an unhelpful isolation of two interrelated 
concepts forcefully corralled into opposing scholarly camps.  
Whilst what has been presented thus far is by no means a comprehensive history of 
zemia’s genealogy, it nevertheless opens up a dialogue regarding its lexical scope and 
underutilised dialectical potential. It is perhaps worth noting that none of this is intended to 
diminish the contributions made thus far by zemiologists. Rather the intention is to expand, 
and where necessary reconceptualise, such work by drawing upon the full range of meaning 
contained within the word zemia. When reframed and viewed in this light, the organising 
theme around which the zemiological movement is built is heir to a broader theoretical and 
empirical focus than hitherto suspected. Evidently, the upshot is that the current drive to 
impose strict disciplinary borders between the study of crime and harm is misplaced since an 
accurate translation of zemia does not support the imposition of such boundaries. To proceed 
as if zemia simply represents ‘the Greek word for harm’ is not only conceptually inaccurate, 
but analytically, theoretically and empirically unproductive. Therefore, instead of divorcing 
the facet of harm from the broader contexts with which the word zemia is concerned, we 
must reconceptualise zemia’s analytical reach in accordance with its full range of meaning. 
 
 
Reconceptualising Boundaries 
In their drive to establish and develop zemiology as a new and comprehensive discipline 
distinct from criminology (Hillyard 2013; Pemberton 2016), many of the early zemiologists 
have been described as resembling quite closely positivist social scientists (Loader and 
Sparks 2011). This alleged resemblance can arguably be seen in a number of respects but 
perhaps most clearly in their attempt to secure “distinct borders and clear demarcations” 
between crime and harm and between criminology and zemiology (Young 2007, 9). It may 
also be seen in the use of official statistics to support the misnomer that “‘crime’ consists of 
many petty events” and that such events would not “score particularly highly on a scale of 
personal hardship” (Hillyard and Tombs 2007, 11). Such an assertion arguably pays little 
regard to the experiential reality of crime or the very real consequences for those who 
experience this reality as harm in the empirical domain of everyday life. It serves no useful 
purpose to deny that “crime produces universally discernible and distressing harms to all 
sorts of victims” (Hall 2012, 160). Nor is it helpful to act as if crime and harm are essentially 
different currencies in some strange hierarchy of intellectual capital rather than representing 
two sides of the same coin.  
However, this critique must be viewed in context. The principal driving force behind 
the emergence of the zemiological movement was a desire to “move beyond the narrow 
confines of criminology” (Hillyard et al. 2004b, 1). Admirably, the early contributors to this 
developing programme of study marshalled a movement to fight against the surging tide of a 
discipline that has historically favoured the investigation and analysis of ‘conventional’ 
volume crime. Certainly, it is no secret that politically influential strands of criminology 
continue to restrict themselves to this crime type and disregard crimes committed by or on 
behalf of the state, crimes that are technologically sophisticated and/or corporate in nature, 
and a plethora of un-criminalised harms that emanate from the way in which our current 
social system is organised. The effect is the obfuscation of the full extent of crime and harm 
present in today’s world. The academic records show quite clearly that paradigmatically 
dominant strands of criminology have tended to treat crime, deviance and harm as separate 
yet occasionally overlapping concepts (Smith and Raymen 2016). Rather than view such 
phenomena through a suitably holistic analytical frame the dominant trend has been towards 
‘analytical individualism’. This is precisely what the early zemiologists were trying to rectify. 
Indeed, Hillyard et al. (2004b, 2) make it clear that “it is a central premise of this book that it 
makes no sense to separate out harms, which can be defined as criminal, from all other types 
of harm”.   
However, criminology and zemiology continue to be cast in opposing roles, as 
possessing some innate incompatibility that precludes any hope of collaborative integration. 
All too often during this casting process criminology is reduced to a “scarcely recognisable 
caricature” (Loader and Sparks 2011, 25). What emerges from this reduction is a conflation 
of diverse and multifaceted criminologies into a singular orthodox ‘criminology’ indubitably 
in service of the state and therefore controlled and constrained by governmental agendas and 
definitions (Hughes 2007, 2006). Whilst such an ‘administrative’ criminology undoubtedly 
does exist to some degree, it is not indicative of all criminology, or of criminology per se. 
Rather it is but one, albeit influential, form of criminology that emerged in the 1950s 
(Tierney 2010). Yet, rather than constituting a part of the sum total, this administrative form 
of criminology is often viewed as ‘criminology ad totum’. This simplistic and convenient 
reading of what criminology is or is not allows the fabrication of a suitable ‘straw(wo)man’ 
that is easy to criticize and rally against (Hughes 2006, 2007).  
Whilst the pluralistic nature of criminology has to some extent been acknowledged, 
there is still a tendency to view criminology as a discipline inextricably constrained by the 
remit of the state and the limits imposed by its drive for pragmatism (Hillyard and Tombs 
2017). This is probably true for the most part but not in its entirety. There are a number of 
important yet understated criminological developments that have undoubtedly taken harm 
seriously. For example, the increasingly popular ultra-realism utilises an advanced 
conception of harm to explore the reality of our times and explain why individuals inflict 
harm on others in pursuit of self-interest (Hall and Winlow 2015). In doing so, ultra-realism 
provides a genuine alternative to the dominant paradigms currently constraining the 
discipline. This new approach, which has made great strides towards ontologically grounding 
the concept of harm, represents a discernible break from state-centric approaches and does 
not attempt simply to extend conceptions of what constitutes ‘crime’. In other words its 
object of study is not determined by the state. Indeed, ultra-realism has recently formed the 
basis of numerous stringent critiques of contemporary social issues perhaps thought to be 
outside the remit of ‘traditional’ criminological inquiry (Hayward and Smith 2017; Wakeman 
2017). For instance, ultra-realism has provided the philosophical and theoretical foundations 
for the development of a ‘deviant leisure’ perspective which seeks to explore the harms 
associated with commodified forms of leisure (Hayward and Smith 2017). 
It is salient to emphasise that criminology and zemiology are by no means unified 
entities. Indeed, both fields are characterised by significant paradigmatic junctures, widely 
varying views on the nature of ‘their’ subject matter and the relevancy and legitimacy of 
content, as well as a fair bit of infighting. Even the most cursory scan through the contents of 
the voluminous criminology textbooks now available will reveal a scattered history of a 
discipline very much ‘divided amongst itself’. This is also true of zemiology, if perhaps much 
less evident, for it currently has been unable to pull together all the existing work into a 
unifying disciplinary perspective (Hillyard 2013). What appears evident throughout the 
emerging zemiological literature is the presence of long running tensions between those who 
wish to abandon and move entirely beyond criminology and those who wish to incorporate 
the analysis of social harm within the fold of critical criminology (Pemberton 2016). Whilst 
both criminology and zemiology can of course exist independently from each other, the 
fundamental upshot is that both criminology and zemiology have by and large failed to 
identify the numerous strands of connective tissue shared by these two social scientific 
bodies. Rather than celebrating meaningful and productive synergies both bodies are 
continuously misidentified and often reduced to a series of simplistic signifiers.     
Hillyard (2013) has, for example, identified some of the abovementioned tendencies 
at play in ‘criminology’s’ reaction to the emergence of zemiology. In an admittedly tongue-
in-cheek topology Hillyard identifies five types or forms of reaction that zemiology has 
received on behalf of ‘criminology’ which he refers to as colonialists, imperialists, 
nationalists, reluctant nationalists and misguided nationalists. None of these support an 
independent zemiology free from the clutches of a ‘state-centric’ ‘criminology’. Quite 
simply, it appears that influential sections of criminology have not taken the zemiological 
movement seriously enough. Certainly, this is to some extent reflected in Newburn’s (2017) 
enervations regarding the potential longevity of the movement. However, at the same time 
that we see criminology’s cagy response to zemiology, we witness what might be termed the 
‘separatist’ or ‘independent’ branch of zemiology offer its own caricatured interpretations of 
‘criminology’. Interpretations that, as already noted, see ‘criminology’ as being infinitely 
confined to an operative view defined by the state and its legal system from which it is 
seemingly unable to free itself. Yet this ostensibly fails to acknowledge that a great deal of 
the salient criticisms laid at criminology’s door have been immanent. That is to say they have 
emerged from within the discipline of criminology itself, emanating largely from the work of 
various influential critical and radical criminologists who laid much of the groundwork upon 
which the Beyond Criminology project would later tread (Loader and Sparks 2011; Hughes 
2006).  
In the years since the original publication of Beyond Criminology, the simple 
caricature of criminology noted above has persisted (Hillyard and Tombs 2007; Hillyard 
2013; Pemberton 2016). Advances in the realms of critical and radical criminology and the 
multiplicity of perspectives that have facilitated the expansion of the discipline’s intellectual 
scope (Ross and Richards 2003) have been largely ignored or downplayed. Moreover, there 
appears to be little acknowledgment that both criminology and zemiology are 
interdisciplinary rendezvous subjects capable of incorporating and utilising a broad gamut of 
perspectives to explore and explain pressing social phenomena. There also appears to be little 
recognition that some of the most significant contemporary advances in both of these 
disciplines have been made by those willing to expand rather than abandon the criminological 
imagination by incorporating sophisticated and cutting-edge approaches from cognate fields 
of study (Hall 2012; Hall and Winlow 2015; Yar 2012; Raymen 2016; Ellis 2016).  
Even when some concessions are made regarding criminology’s long history of 
incorporating social harm within its orbit of inquiry we are often met with yet more confusing 
distinctions and demarcations. For some, the study of social harm is now firmly and 
legitimately located within the purview of critical criminology and does not necessarily 
“capture the notion of a discipline” (Hillyard 2013, 232-233). Therefore reference to 
zemiology is stressed in order to distinguish the emerging new discipline from its 
criminological counterpart, and more importantly, to demarcate those who wish to ‘move 
beyond’ criminology from those who wish to broaden its parameters (Hillyard 2013; 
Pemberton 2016). For others, however, social harm is “the organising concept for zemiology 
as a field of study” (Pemberton 2016, 7). There undoubtedly remains some confusion here as 
to whether or not immutable conceptual differences separate ‘zemiology’ and the ‘social 
harms’ approach. Meanwhile, amidst all the confusion of hastily formed distinctions and 
demarcations, influential sections of criminology and zemiology continue to jostle for 
position. Particular schools of thought, which are inaccurately portrayed as being the 
quintessential face of their discipline par excellence, thus continue to over-determine and 
trivialise ‘conventional’ volume crime, and over-analyse and downplay the crimes of the poor 
and the harms committed by the state. However, amongst all the jostling these influential 
strands of criminology and zemiology have missed the point; they have failed to notice the 
pertinent crossovers that a more collegial approach might otherwise reveal. 
Rather than acknowledge that there are numerous patches of common ground to be 
found between criminology and zemiology, we are instead left with overstated differences 
predicated upon an inaccurate understanding of what zemia means. Indeed, as has been 
shown, nowhere in zemia’s genealogy is there to be found any innate, natural or inevitable 
fault lines. Instead, an accurate reading of the meaning of zemia reveals closer connections 
between harm, crime, and the punishment of legal transgression than a number of academics 
have previously suspected, or have been willing to admit. This is not to suggest that we 
should reposition the concept of ‘crime’ at the forefront of our analysis, or that criminal 
harms represent the most salient dangers facing the social world, or indeed that the answer 
lays in completely dispensing with ‘crime’ as an empirical and analytical object of inquiry 
(Yar 2012). It is simply to note that if we are to attain a more holistic understanding of both 
criminalised and un-criminalised harms and their multifaceted interconnections we must 
transcend the perpetuation of false dichotomies and artificial disciplinary boundaries. At the 
very least, it highlights that abstract references to partial notions of zemia cannot be used to 
support the imposition of false alternatives between crime and harm or between criminology 
and zemiology.  
Instead of facilitating a more holistic exploration of criminalised and un-criminalised 
harms, the current dominant tendency to force an imaginary dualism between the study of 
crime and harm results in a failure to consider multiple layers of hidden victimage (Kotzé and 
Boukli 2016). Indeed, by disconnecting criminal and un-criminalised harm we risk doing 
precisely what Hillyard et al. (2004b) explicitly wished to avoid – capturing only isolated 
strata of contemporary victimisation’s multifaceted complexity. This is precisely because 
‘crime’ and ‘harm’ are interactive and integrative bilateral processes. One may either ignite 
or emanate from the other in ways that resemble a bilateral implosion or fusion, thereby 
creating specific yet nuanced and multifaceted phenomena that cannot be subjected to 
analytical dualism. The early zemiologists undoubtedly recognised and understood part of 
this complexity for they drew attention to the inadequacy of concentrating solely upon events 
officially defined as ‘crime’, which certainly excludes a great many un-criminalised harms 
(Hillyard and Tombs 2004). However, in a similar move for which they criticise 
‘mainstream’ criminology, some have predominantly trained their analytical lens to focus 
upon un-criminalised harms to the near exclusion of its criminalised counterpart (Pemberton 
2016). This somewhat unilateral focus, generally centred upon state crimes and systemically 
induced social harms, largely fails to acknowledge “the second layer of hidden victimage 
often perpetrated and experienced by the very victims of these state crimes and systemic 
harms” (Kotzé and Boukli 2016, 820).  
In doing so some sections of zemiology display a tendency to downplay the complex 
relationship between crime and harm, often labelling the former as ‘petty’ (Hillyard and 
Tombs 2004, 2007; Pemberton 2016). However as criminology has so often reminded us, 
there is nothing ‘trivial’, ‘petty’ or insignificant about persistent offences or incivilities 
largely perpetrated by and against those in precarious socioeconomic positions (Young 1988, 
1975). Indeed, the cumulative effect of such occurrences can have devastating consequences. 
The tragic case of Fiona Pilkington who, having endured years of abuse from local youths, 
killed herself and her daughter in October 2007 is a case in point. This, as Chakraborti (2010, 
1) notes, undoubtedly “highlights in no uncertain terms the devastating cumulative impact of 
so-called ‘low-level’ incidents”. Far from merely representing some unimportant mass of 
officially defined, discrete and measurable incidents fixed in space and time, ‘crime’ is fluid 
(Hall 2005). It ebbs and flows within the broad channels of wider socioeconomic and 
politico-cultural contexts as it interacts, causally and/or effectually, with serious social harms. 
Whichever way you cut it, criminalised and un-criminalised harms coexist in a complex 
relationship characterised by a finely nuanced interplay of harmful absences and events that 
damage not only individual human subjects but the wider social body. 
We cannot therefore continue to arbitrarily separate crime and harm in such a way as 
to subject one side of the equation to critical analysis only at the expense of the other. To do 
so evidently results in a rather stilted and incomplete view of such complex social 
phenomena. Instead, these two facets must be viewed together through a holistic analytical 
framework developed through a thoroughly integrated approach towards the study of 
criminalised and un-criminalised harms. This prospect raises a number of pertinent questions 
as to precisely how we might achieve such a thoroughly integrated approach. Whilst this 
chapter can offer no definitive blueprint that neatly sketches out the way forward, it can 
nevertheless be suggested that the first step in this proposed direction must necessarily be to 
dispense with the unhelpful tendency to cast criminology and zemiology as diametrically 
opposed entities. Accordingly, when confronted with the increasingly popular question 
‘criminology or zemiology?’ the reply should be an emphatic ‘yes, please!’, for this is 
arguably the only logical response. 
 
Towards an Integrated Approach  
What is being advocated here is a simple refusal of choice between false alternatives (Žižek 
2000). There is no real alternative on offer here, for each ‘option’ simply represents one 
distorted lens from which to view and make sense of crime and harm. It is akin to being 
asked to choose between using only your left or right eye, leaving you straining desperately 
for a broader vision. To choose one over the other is therefore to risk a myopic and limited 
view of all that ails society, precisely because such ailments are often made up of complex 
and subtlety interconnected forms of various criminalised and un-criminalised harms. Indeed, 
the pervasiveness of systemic harms is unquestionable (Hillyard et al. 2004a; Davies, Francis, 
and Wyatt 2014), yet such harms, which are subject to intense zemiological, and sporadic 
critical criminological scrutiny, often precipitate criminal acts that are not always afforded 
the same attention. In part, this may be due to an entrenched fear that to draw attention to 
these precipitated criminal acts is to further criminalise the poor. Yet far from protecting the 
powerless, this equation of analysis with criminalisation serves only to mask the true extent 
of their plight (Young 1988; Currie 2009; Hall and Winlow 2015). Indeed, not only are the 
poor subject to numerous social, political and economic injustices, but for many the path 
taken to ameliorate such inequitable social circumstances engenders further harm and misery.  
For instance, many of those who constitute the indivisible remainder of 
neoliberalism’s wasteful and rejecting logic (Bauman 2000) often have little option than to 
offset their socioeconomic redundancy by becoming involved in various aspects of the hidden 
economy (Lea 1999, 2002). Far from constituting ‘petty’ acts of crime, such involvement is 
fraught with harm for all those involved. Individuals are forced to flirt dangerously with 
illegality and risk being absorbed into more dangerous criminal enterprises that carry heavy 
penalties as they try to negotiate the boundaries between harmful and beneficial criminal 
activity (Lea 1999, 2002). This should serve as a crucial reminder that the roles of victim and 
offender are not mutually exclusive but often overlap extensively. Nowhere is this made 
clearer than in the literature documenting the victimisation of the homeless. This body of 
literature clearly demonstrates how such individuals suffer “the ultimate state of 
victimisation” since they are victimised not only by the state and the general public, but 
indeed from within the homeless population itself (Fitzpatrick, La Gory, and Ritchey 1993, 
366; Garland, Richards, and Cooney 2010; Lee and Schreck 2005).  
Rather than being viewed as unimportant ‘petty’ crime undeserving of our attention, 
such examples should be understood as a corollary of broader systemic harms wrought by 
neoliberal market capitalism. Accordingly, it makes little sense to view ‘crime’ as somehow 
independent of harmful absences or processes that result from the way in which we organise 
our social system. Instead, it must be acknowledged that ‘crime’ and ‘harm’ are two sides of 
the same coin. Crucially, there are fundamental synergies between criminology and 
zemiology that, if brought to bear on contemporary academic thought, could facilitate the 
exploration of a broader range of societal ills than each is capable of achieving alone. Perhaps 
now more than ever it is necessary for us to explore with more rigour the interconnected 
complexities of crime and harm by connecting the dots rather than forcing a wedge between 
criminology and zemiology. If this is to be achieved, we must dispense with unhelpful 
dichotomies that incorrectly advance criminology and zemiology as inherently polarised and 
competing projects based upon a limited understanding of zemia. Not only does such a view 
show little comprehension of zemia’s genealogy, but it encourages both analytical and 
empirical inertia. As we begin to see ever growing tensions coupled with increasing levels of 
visible social dislocation manifest at alarming rates (Žižek 2012), we can afford no 
disciplinary myopia but require all of our intellectual acuity. Indeed, as Thomas Hardy once 
noted, “if a way to the better there be, it lies in taking a full look at the worst” (cited in 
Becker 1975, xi, emphasis added).  
This is precisely the point and it bears labouring; a full look at the worst necessitates 
an integrated approach capable of exploring and explaining both criminalised and un-
criminalised harms. It requires a concerted effort to traverse artificial disciplinary borders and 
dispel fierce ‘topical guardianship’. Instead of ignoring phenomena because they are deemed 
to be outside of some supposedly predefined remit, or trivialising acts of illegality because 
they are not deemed ‘serious enough’, we should have greater cognisance of their complex, 
multifaceted and nuanced interconnections. Yet despite the desperate need of such an 
integrated approach, criminology and zemiology continue to be cast as incompatible entities 
characterised by what are thought to be immutable differences that presuppose a necessary 
separateness. Undoubtedly, as Hillyard and Tombs (2017) have recently noted, a great deal 
more needs to be done in order to explore and establish the relationship between criminology 
and zemiology. This could perhaps be taken a step further by suggesting that during this 
process more needs to be done to affirm their compatibility and reciprocity.  
 
Conclusion 
Since the emergence of zemiology as a new discipline seemingly distinct from criminology 
(Hillyard 2013), many of those within its fold have operated under the assumption that zemia, 
the organising concept around which zemiology is built, simply represents ‘the Greek word 
for harm’. This lingering oversimplification has had profound and lasting effects, not least of 
all because it has all too often been used as a conceptual hammer to drive an artificial wedge 
between the study of crime and harm. Having laid the groundwork in the foregoing 
discussions, it is appropriate to answer the two questions posed in the introduction to this 
chapter. The answer to both questions is of course a firm ‘no’. The meaning of zemia has not 
been adequately explored or applied; nor does a holistic reading of the meaning of zemia 
substantiate the tendency to position crime and harm and criminology and zemiology as 
diametric opposites.   
It is clear that there has hitherto been insufficient attention paid to the highly nuanced 
lexical formation of zemia. Instead, the word has been carved up and trimmed of its 
numerous other connotations so that it commonly conveys only a portion of its broader 
meaning. Accordingly, this chapter has sought to trace with more accuracy the semantical 
complexities of zemia and in doing so has demonstrated that it possess a broader range of 
meaning than previously acknowledged. Far from simply denoting harm, zemia has a clear 
association with crime and its punishment. In fact, an accurate reading of zemia clearly shows 
that it denotes closer connections between harm, crime and its punishment than many 
academics would perhaps care to admit. Nowhere in zemia’s genealogy is there to be found 
any support for the imposition of artificial boundaries or false dichotomies between crime 
and harm or between criminology and zemiology. In reality, quite the opposite is true. That is 
to say that a more thorough examination and application of the word zemia actually implies 
and facilitates a more integrated approach between criminology and zemiology. 
The importance of developing such an integrated approach should not be 
underestimated for criminalised and un-criminalised harms coexist in a complex relationship 
and as such cannot be sufficiently explored as isolated phenomena. Indeed, the multifaceted 
interplay of harmful absences and events or processes that surround both crime and harm 
cannot be arbitrarily divided and placed into neatly formed categories that ‘belong’ to certain 
disciplines. If we are to attain a more holistic understanding of both criminalised and un-
criminalised harms, and their highly nuanced and complex interconnections, we must 
transcend artificially imposed disciplinary boundaries and the perpetuation of false 
alternatives between criminology and zemiology. Perhaps a good place to start is to 
acknowledge the speciousness of removing from zemia its clear association with crime and 
its punishment and forcibly limiting its denotation to various forms of un-criminalised harms. 
From here we may begin to analytically reconnect crime and harm and recognise the 
collaborative potential of criminology and zemiology to provide a stronger lens through 
which we may take a full look at the worst.          
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